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 1 Introduction
The establishment of the euro in 1999 was seen by many as perhaps the
greatest monetary experiment of all time. While of course currency uni￿ca-
tion had occurred in the past (as had currency separations), the monetary
and ￿nancial system have come to play a much greater role for the smooth
functioning of the economy, making the introduction of a new currency in an
economy as large and as sophisticated as that of the euro area a truly major
undertaking.
With almost a decade having passed, it is an opportune time to assess
what the implication of the euro for economic welfare might have been. In this
chapter we investigate the impact on the euro on macroeconomic volatility,
broadly de￿ned. The key question we study is straightforward: has the
establishment of the euro reduced volatility of macroeconomic aggregates? In
addressing this issue it is essential to note that the absolute level of volatility
may have changed for reasons unrelated to EMU. Thus, our focus is on
investigating whether EMU members have experienced a decline in volatility
relative to each other and to other countries, in a way we discuss further
below.
To preview the results, we ￿nd that macroeconomic stability has increased
since the inception of EMU. The e⁄ect on nominal stability ￿the volatility
of short and long interest rates and of in￿ ation ￿has been particularly large,
but there has also been an increase in the stability of real variables. Much of
this decline in volatility has occured between EMU members but also, though
to a somewhat lesser extent, between EMU and non-members. Though our
1results do not directly allow us to conclude that outsiders￿macroeconomies
have become more stable as an immediate consequence of EMU they do ￿
to the least ￿suggest that there is an important international dimension to
the creation of the euro in the sense that the euro area has become a pole of
stability in the global economy.
The most important real e⁄ect of the euro that we identify is that con-
sumption has become much smoother, a result that we ￿nd deserves special
emphasis for two reasons. First, consumption and its volatility directly im-
pact on welfare since ￿unlike output or income ￿consumption enters house-
holds￿utility functions.
Secondly, while consumption volatility could have decreased for a number
of reasons, notably better and more synchronized macroeconomic policies, in
particular monetary policy, the very pattern of the decline in volatility is
informative by itself: the fact that ￿among real variables ￿we see increased
smoothness mainly in consumption and less so in output or equity returns
suggests that the decline in consumption volatility may to a large extent be
due to better risk sharing, plausibly brought about through a widening and
deepening of ￿nancial markets following the inception of EMU. Indeed, we
argue that the creation of EMU has been pivotal for the rise in international
risk sharing, which has been documented by an emerging literature (e.g.,
Sorensen, Wu, Yosha and Zu (2007), Artis and Ho⁄mann (2007a,b and 2008):
EMU is associated with more risk sharing not only among its members but
also of EMU countries with non-members, whereas risk sharing among non-
member countries does not seem to have increased very much.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. We set the scene by
2documenting a global decline in macroeconomic volatility in the next section.
Since this global decline could have a multitude of causes that are unrelated
to the inception of the euro, we focus the discussion on what we call relative
volatility ￿or speci￿cally: the volatility of relative variables ￿in Section
three. Section four lays out our framework for ident￿ying the internal and
international dimension of the impact of EMU on volatility, showing that
patterns in relative volatility are indeed closely related to the inception of
EMU. Section ￿ve then focuses on the decline in consumption volatility,
singling out improved risk sharing as its main source. Section six summarizes
and concludes.
2 Trends in global volatility
As a ￿rst step, we develop some stylized facts with respect to what we call
real and nominal volatility. Real variability is captured by the standard
deviations of real GDP growth, real consumption growth and stock market
returns as a proxy of the real return to capital. We measure nominal volatility
through the standard deviations of changes in short and long interest rates
and in￿ ation. All data are quarterly, obtained from the IMF￿ s international
￿nancial statistics. There are 25 countries in our sample: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
The reason we limit our sample to industrialised economies is that many
3emerging market economies have experienced bouts of volatility over our
sample period (e.g. the Asian and Russian crises of the late 1990s) for reasons
that are unrelated to the creation of the euro. Including such economies into
our analysis of the impact of EMU on global volatility might distort our
results.
It is well known that volatility declined across the world starting in the
mid 1980s, a phenomenon referred to as the ￿ great moderation￿(McConnell
and Queres-Piros (2000), Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2003), Bordo and
Helbling (2004), Stock and Watson (2005)). To avoid having our results be
unduly a⁄ected by this event, we use data starting in 1990 and ending in
2006/7. We break this sample in two subperiods ￿the ten years before the
inception of the euro in January 1999 and the years since. Our sample ends
in the fourth quarter of 2006.
Figure 1 provides Artis-Stockman-type cross-plots of these standard de-
viations for the variables discussed above, for the two subperiods. The top
row is for a set of real variables (GDP and consumption growth, stock mar-
ket returns), the lower row of panels focuses on nominal variables (short and
long interest rates and in￿ ation). Points below the the 45-degree line indi-
cate that volatility was higher before the establishment of EMU. The ￿gure
shows that there is some evidence that the volatility of real GDP growth
has generally declined. The volatility of real consumption growth has fallen
markedly for all but one of the countries considered. Stock market volatity
does not appear to have systematically changed.
Turning to the nominal variables, we see that volatility has declined in
almost all countries, re￿ ecting the increased focus by central banks on achiev-
4ing and maintaining low and stable in￿ ation.
3 Global vs. country-speci￿c volatility
The decline in volatility that is apparent from Figure 1 seems to a⁄ect EMU
and non-EMU countries alike. This suggests that there must be a common,
possibly global, factor playing a role. Such a common factor may be unre-
lated to EMU and may be due to a decline in the volatility of global shocks,
lower volatility in ￿nancial markets due to ￿nancial innovation or increased
liquidity etc. In what follows, we therefore condition on any factor that
may have a⁄ected all countries by focussing on the volatilities of bilateral
di⁄erences between consumption and output growth, levels of interest rates
etc. For brevity but with some abuse of language, we refer to the volatility
of relative variables as relative or as country-pair speci￿c volatility through-
out the paper. This focus on relative volatilities does not preclude us from
identifying international e⁄ects of EMU as we discuss below. Our setup only
assumes that the e⁄ect of EMU is greater on some industrialised countries
than it is on others ￿a presumption that we deem uncontroversial since only
a subset of all industrialised countries in our sample are EMU members.
In fact, looking at relative volatilities directly allows us to study a par-
ticularly interesting aspect of the variation in the data. To understand this,
note that our data set comprises n countries and therefore n(n ￿ 1)=2 inde-
pendent country pairs. By comparing the results for pairs of EMU members,
pairs with one EMU member, and pairs with no EMU members can we get
at the important issue of the relative impact of EMU on members and non-
5members.
Figure 2 provides cross-plots of idiosyncratic volatility measures for the
two subperiods. Again, the top row is for a set of real variables and the
lower row of panels focuses on nominal variables. The ￿gure also allows us
to distinguish whether a particular country pair involves one EMU Country
(dots), two EMU countries (circles) or none at all (x￿ s)
For the nominal variables, there is a generalised decline in idiosyncratic
volatility, as is evidenced by the fact that most of the points fall below the
45 degree line. While this e⁄ect is apparent for intra-EMU country pairings,
it is also seems to be important for pairs that involve only one EMU country.
>From Figure 2, a general decline in idiosyncratic volatility is less readily
apparent for real variables. In particular, the period since the creation of
EMU does not appear to be characterised by systematically less volatile GDP
growth or stock market return di⁄erentials. This is in contrast to the ￿ndings
for absolute volatility in the previous section and suggests that the continued
great moderation in stock markets and in real GDP growth is indeed largely
due to a moderation in the volatility of global factors and not so much due
to a diminuishing role of country-speci￿c in￿ uences. This ￿nding is in line
with those reported in Panetta et al. (2006) and Gerlach et al. (2006).
Among the real variables, a general decline in relative volatility is clearest
for consumption. This is noteworthy because theory holds that consumption
enters directly into the utility function of agents and consumption volatility
has therefore an important impact on economic welfare. By contrast, theory
has less to say about the importance of a decline in the volatility of output
or income.
6Furthermore, economic theory would predict that ￿nancial integration
directly a⁄ects idiosyncratic volatility of consumption through better risk
sharing. The e⁄ect of ￿nancial globalization on consumption risk sharing has
generally been quite hard to capture empirically (see the survey in Kose et
al. (2007)). However, a recent literature has made some progress along these
lines (Artis and Ho⁄mann (2007a, b, 2008) and Słrensen Wu, Yosha and Zu
(2007)), showing that consumption risk sharing has indeed increased with the
internationalisation of the external investment position of most industrialised
economies. Our results are compatible with these ￿ndings.
Finally, the theoretical case for a decline in the relative volatility of con-
sumption is much more clear-cut than it is for output or stock market volatil-
ity: Other things being equal, one would expect ￿nancial integration to lead
to lower relative volatility of consumption. Conversely, while economic inte-
gration might also increase the symmetry of output ￿ uctuations, the theoret-
ical case for economic integration to increase the importance of idiosyncratic
in￿ uences on output growth can equally well be made. For instance, eco-
nomic integration may allow regions and countries to exploit patterns of
comparative advantage. To the extent that supply shocks are sector speci￿c,
this could actually lead to increased asymmetry. This point was prominently
suggested by Krugman (1993) and the results in Kalemli-Ozcan, Słrensen
and Yosha (2001) provide strong support for its empirical relevance. In the
same mould, Heathcote and Perri (2004) suggest that output growth in the
U.S. has actually become less synchronized with the rest of the world as
￿nancial integration has advanced.
For all these reasons, the decline in the volatility of consumption is sig-
7ni￿cant and we explore further its implications below.
4 Internal and international e⁄ects of EMU
on volatility
4.1 EMU and volatility levels
What is the role of EMU in determining volatility? We investigate this
question in Tables 1 and 2. For the two sub-periods, these tables provide
regressions of relative volatility on a dummy that takes the value of unity
if country in the pair is an EMU member (the ￿ international￿dummy) and
a dummy that takes the value of unity if both countries are EMU members
(the ￿ EMU￿dummy). To see how these regressions may shed light on the
issues at hand, suppose that EMU has reduced the importance of country-
speci￿c shocks. If so, one would expect the volatility of EMU pairs to have
fallen quite a bit relative to pairs not involving EMU members. Similarly,
the elimination of idiosyncratic policies within EMU could have lowered the
volatility of pairs involving only one EMU country, though we would expect
this to have declined somewhat less. While it is beyond the scope of this
paper to o⁄er a full taxonomy of the structural causes of the decline in
volatility, we provide a further interpretation of our ￿ndings related to these
two dummies below.
Since third factors, in particular globalization, could have a⁄ected the
observed patterns of macroeconomic volatility, in our regressions, we also
use a range of control variables that capture trade and ￿nancial openness,
8￿nancial deepening as well as the exposure of countries to terms of trade
shocks.
Speci￿cally, we use the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP as a
measure of trade openness and the sum of assets and liabilities as measure
of ￿nancial openness. We use the volatility of the terms of trade to control
for the size of external shocks. To capture the exposure of an economy to
such shocks, we further include a measure of trade concentration in natural
resource or primary sectors and a measure of trade diversi￿cation (see Gerlach
(1999)).1
As is apparent from Table 1, pairs of countries that later joined EMU
had consistently lower relative nominal volatility as well as a lower volatility
of real GDP already in the period before 1999. This re￿ ects the considerable
convergence that been achieved by the EMU candidates before monetary
union. Almost the same is true for the ￿ mixed￿pairs, though, as one would
expect, the point estimate of the e⁄ect of volatility is about that for the EMU
pairs.
Table 2 reports the results for the EMU period. Interestingly, there is no
longer a signi￿cant e⁄ect of EMU on nominal volatility ￿be it among member
or vis-￿-vis outsiders. This again can be read as an indication that the bulk
of nominal convergence that EMU has fostered took place already in the
run-up to 1999. Conversely, Table 2 clearly shows that after 1999, EMU has
had a pronounced e⁄ect on the relative volatility of real variables. While
1Note that we do not have data on bilateral country characteristics, such as ￿nan-
cial and trade ￿ ows or capital account openess. We generate such country-pair-speci￿c
characteristics as simple arithmetic means of the respective country-speci￿c variables.
9country pairs involving EMU members continue to display lower relative
GDP volatility, the relative volatility of stock market returns has increased
signi￿cnatly. Most importantly, EMU is now associated with signi￿cantly
lower volatility of relative consumption growth rates. All of these e⁄ects,
again, pertain to both the international and the internal dimension of EMU,
with the impact on mixed country pairs being somewhat smaller but still
large and signi￿cant.
As shown by Tables 1 and 2, in both sub-periods the signs of the control
variables ￿to the extent that they are signi￿cant ￿are generally as expected.
Trade openness is associated with higher volatility of GDP and consumption
growth as is the presence of capital controls, while ￿nancial openness is neg-
atively related to volatility. This is an important ￿nding since it suggests
that international ￿nancial trade depresses volatility, an e⁄ect that we will
return to further below. There is no robust e⁄ect across subperiods of the
control variables on nominal volatility or on stock market returns.
One notable aspect of these results is that we consistently ￿nd the volatil-
ity of the terms of trade to be associated with lower relative volatility of GDP
and consumption growth. If the terms of trade were a truly exogenous source
of shocks, we would expect a positive sign: higher terms of trade volatility
should be associated with higher consumption and GDP volatility. The fact
that we ￿nd a negative sign suggest that the terms of trade and the real
exchange rate could by themselves act as shock absorber rather than as a
source of shocks. This interpretation is supported by the recent ￿ndings of
other researchers (see European Commission (2007)).
104.2 EMU and the decline in global volatility
While our results suggest that EMU have had a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the level
of relative volatiliy for both member and non-member pairs of countries,
the ￿ndings reported in Tables 1 and 2 are not directly informative about
what role EMU may have played in explaining the decline in macroeconomic
volatility over time. We turn to this issue next.
To this end, we provide in Table 3 regressions of the change in volatility
between the two subperiods on the EMU and international dummies along
with the controls used in the previous sections.2 As an additional condition-
ing variable, for each of our three real and nominal variables, we also include
the respective lagged (i.e. pre-EMU) volatility into the regression. This is
motivated by Figure 2 which would suggest that ￿in spite of the general
decline in relative volatility ￿the level of volatility in the period before EMU
remains an important determinant of volatility also in the period after 1999.












where ij denotes the pair of countries i and j, ￿ is the relative variability of
the respective nominal or real variable, Inter and EMU are our international
dimension and EMU dummies respectively that take the value of one if one
2It would appear that one way to obtain insight into the decline in volatility over
time is to look at a version of the regressions in Table 1 or 2 where the regressors and
the dependent variable have been di⁄erenced across subperiods. This is, however, not
practically feasible, because the regressors do not change at all (EMU membership status)
or almost not (e.g. relative measures of trade openness change very little).
11(Inter) or both (EMU) countries in pair ij are EMU members and zero
otherwise. The subscripts PRE and EMU, denote variables from the pre-
EMU and EMU periods respectively. The vector Zij stacks the trade and
￿nancial openness controls.
The results in Table 3 show a highly signi￿cant and negative estimate
of ￿1 for all variables except output growth. This e⁄ect is particularly pro-
nounced for the three nominal variables, for which the estimate of ￿1 is close
to negative unity. This con￿rms the impression from Figure 2 that relative
volatility has fallen almost across the board but that this decline has been
far more drastic for nominal variables.
In addition, those country pairs that involve at least one EMU country,
have generally experienced even more drastic declines in volatility. Among
the nominal variables, this is true for both in￿ ation and long interest rates.
Among the real variables, EMU has had a strong e⁄ect on the decline in
relative GDP and consumption growth volatility. Again, for all variables,
the intra-EMU e⁄ect is stronger than it is vis-￿-vis outsiders (by about a
factor of two), but still the international dimension is highly signi￿cant and
sizeable.
The order of magnitude of the impact of EMU on the volatility of GDP
and consumption is worth noting: EMU membership reduces the relative
volatility of GDP growth by 2 percentage points vis-a-vis other members
and by still one percentage point vis-a-vis outsiders. The e⁄ect on relative
consumption volatility appears even slightly higher.
124.3 Interpreting the international dimension of EMU
The results in the previous tables suggest that the decline in relative volatil-
ity, already apparent from Figure 2 is particularly pronounced among EMU
members. In addition, we have identi￿ed an important international dimen-
sion of EMU in the sense that relative volatility also declines more than
average if only one of the two countries i or j is an EMU member (though
not quite as much as for intra-EMU pairings). To understand these results
better, let xi denote one of the real and nominal variables that we considered
in our analysis so far. Assume that xi is determined by three factors: a global
factor that a⁄ects all countries in the same way, a European factor that we
also allow to a⁄ect all countries but to potentially di⁄erent degrees, and a
purely country-speci￿c factor. Then for two countries i and j we can write
x
i





t = gt + ￿jft + s
j
t
where gt is the global factor, ft is the European factor and st is the country-
speci￿c in￿ uence. The factor loadings ￿i and ￿j capture the exposure of
the respective economy to the European factor. Assuming that ft and st












Note ￿rst, that the idiosyncratic variance is independent of the global
13factor, which is one reason why we focus on relative variances. Secondly,
note that the European factor a⁄ects the relative variance to the extent that
the exposure of the two economies to Europe-wide shocks di⁄ers. To capture
the idea that exposure to the European factor is more similar among pairs of
EMU members than between ￿ mixed￿pairs or non-EMU pairs of countries,
we assume that the squared di⁄erence between the factor loadings (￿i￿￿j)2
is generally smaller if both country i and j are EMU members than if only
one of the countries is an EMU member.
Then the pattern we observe in the data is compatible with the following
explanations: ￿rst, (￿i ￿ ￿j)2 has declined for all country pairs, but it has
declined by more for intra EMU-pairs than for pairs involving only one or
no EMU country. Secondly, the purely idiosyncratic variances have declined,
possibly due to the elimination of disturbances related to poor ￿scal and
monetary policy. Third, var(ft) could have declined. We do not distinguish
between these explanations since there is no reason to believe that they are
mutually exclusive.
Before proceeding, we note that the pattern we observe in the data cannot
be explained by a decline in var(ft) alone, because ￿under the plausible
assumption that the factor loadings, ￿i, for EMU countries are on average
more similar than those of non-EMU countries ￿we would expect such a
decline to have led to a larger decline in relative volatilities among outsiders








t) changing￿which would re￿ ect an increase in the correlation between
the two variables.
145 The decline in consumption volatility
Our ￿ndings highlight that EMU has been associated with a decline in rela-
tive consumption volatility ￿both in as far as intra-EMU volatility as well as
the international dimension are concerned. At a theoretical level, we could
think of this decline in two ways. First, it may re￿ ect a decline in the volatil-
ity of other macroeconomic variables. For instance, more synchronized ￿scal
policy stances as well as the creation of a single monetary policy itself ￿and
the removal of speculative attacks as a source of occasional episodes of sharp
interest rate increases ￿could all have had an direct impact on the volatility
of output, interest rates and in￿ ation and this in turn could have a⁄ected
consumption volatility.
Secondly, consumption may have become more insulated against idio-
syncratic macroeconomic shocks due to better international risk sharing:
the deepening and widening of ￿nancial markets that resulted from EMU
may have allowed households to insure better against ￿ uctuations in their
consumption (perhaps as a consequence of ￿nancial institutions having be-
come able to o⁄er a wider range of ￿nancial products). According to our
results from the previous sections, the volatility of consumption has fallen by
somewhat more than that of output which would indeed suggest that better
consumption risk sharing is a potentially important factor in the decline of
consumption volatility.3
To study to what extent consumption has become better insulated against
3This interpretation is also supported by empirical results in Bekaert et al. (2006)
who show that consumption volatility tends to fall by more than output volatility after
￿nancial liberalizations.
15business cycle volatility, we turn to a by now well-established literature (As-
drubali, Słrensen and Yosha (1996), Słrensen and Yosha (1998), Crucini
(1999), Becker and Ho⁄mann (2006)) which measures risk sharing through
panel regressions the form:
e c
ij
t = ￿ + ￿g gdp
ij
t + ￿





t denotes the di⁄erence xi￿xj for countries i and j and c and gdp
denote the logarithm of real consumption and GDP respectively. We capture
time speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects through ￿t and country-pair speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects
through ￿ij. Finally, ￿
ij
t is the residual and const the regression constant.4
Estimates of ￿ are typically between zero and one, which allows us to
interpret the coe¢ cient as a measure of risk sharing. Speci￿cally, ￿ tells
us the fraction of country-speci￿c volatility in business cycles (i.e. in g gdp
ij
t )
that remains uninsured and that systematically spills over into volatility in
consumption. A value of ￿ near zero would thererfore imply almost perfect
risk sharing, whereas a value near one would indicate no risk sharing. If risk
sharing has indeed increased, we would expect that ￿ has fallen over time.
We present the results from regressions of the form (1) in Panel A of
4In the literature, such regressions have often been estimated in ￿rst di⁄erences of
the idiosyncratic variables. However, Artis and Ho⁄mann (2008) caution against this
practice by showing that in an environment in which the variability of business cycles
may also be declining over time, the coe¢ cient of the di⁄erenced regression will fail to
pick up improvements in international risk sharing. Since a continuded decline in output
variability forms the backdrop for our analysis here, we follow Becker and Ho⁄mann (2006)
and Artis and Ho⁄mann (2006, 2007) and estimate these regressions in relative (log) levels,
a procedure that is less sensitive to changes in the volatility of business cycles by putting
more emphasis on the identi￿cation of longer-term trends in risk sharing. To facilitate the
identi￿cation of these trends further, for this part of our analysis, we also use annual data
from the Penn World tables, release 6.2. (Heston, Summers and Aten (2006)). This data
ranges till 2004.
16Table 7. As is apparent, risk sharing has indeed increased globally since the
inception of EMU. The coe¢ cient ￿ has fallen from about 0:6 to roughly
0:5, suggesting that around 50 percent of all idiosyncratic risk was shared
among the countries in our sample, up from 40 percent in the decade before
EMU ￿a sizeable increase by about one quarter. There are by now a number
of papers that document a statistically signi￿cant link between consumption
risk sharing and ￿nancial globalization (Artis and Ho⁄mann (2007 a, b, 2008)
and Słrensen, Wu, Yosha and Zhu (2007)) and that show that consumption
risk sharing has indeed increased over the last decade. The results in Panel
A are compatible with these ￿ndings. The question we ask here is what role
EMU has played in this global increase in international risk sharing. In order
to address this question, we let ￿ vary across country pairs. Speci￿cally, we
posit the linear relation:
￿ij = ￿0 + ￿1Interij + ￿2EMUij (2)
where Inter and EMU are again our international and EMU dummies re-
spectively. A negative value of ￿1 (￿2) would then imply that a country pair
shares more risk if it involves one (two) EMU members. The coe¢ cient ￿0
tells us how much risk sharing a country pair outside the EMU would achieve,
whereas ￿0 + ￿1 (￿0 + ￿2) indicates the amount of risk shared by country
pairs involving one (two) EMU countries. Once these coe¢ cients have been
estimated, we can then also ask what accounts for the rise in risk sharing. If
it is a global phenomenon, then ￿0 should have decreased. If it due to bet-
ter risk sharing between EMU and non-EMU members, then ￿1 should have
17decreased, whereas if international risk sharing has just increased because
of better intra-EMU risk sharing, we should ￿nd that ￿2 has fallen.
To estimate the coe¢ cients ￿0, ￿1 and ￿2 we use (1) and (2) which gives
us two interaction terms between g gdp
ij
t and Interij and EMUij respectively,
so that the regression we estimate becomes:
e c
ij


















Panel B of Table (6) provides the estimates. The ￿rst column gives the
results for the pre-EMU period, 1990-98, the second for the period since the
beginning of EMU.
The results in Table (6) con￿rm our conjecture that the creation of EMU
plays an important role for international consumption risk sharing: ￿2 is sig-
ni￿cant in the regressions for both subperiods, indicating that EMU mem-
bers (or ￿in the pre-EMU period: candidates that were eventually to become
EMU members) share signi￿cantly more risk with each other than does the
average non-EMU country pair in our sample.
There is, again, also an important international dimension to the results.
The international dummy (￿1) is signi￿cantly negative in the second period:
since the inception of the euro, outsiders share risk with countries inside
EMU more e⁄ectively than among themselves. Again, this e⁄ect is of the
same order of magnitude as the e⁄ect of bilateral EMU membership, though
generally somewhat weaker: the coe¢ cient ￿1 is signi￿cantly negative but
smaller in absolute value than ￿2.
18Panel C summarizes our results by providing the net extent of risk sharing
for non-EMU members (￿0) and along the international (￿0+￿1) and internal
(￿0 + ￿2) dimensions respectively. This synopsis helps illustrate the pivotal
role that the creation of EMU seems to have played in the international
rise in risk sharing. In fact, non-EMU members share somewhat less risk
among themselves than before 1999, as evidenced by the fact that ￿0 increases
from 0:67 to 0:79. But this seems to be more than substituted for by the
signi￿cant increase in risk sharing between outsiders and EMU members.
The sum ￿0 + ￿1 decreases from 0:63 to 0:53. Interestingly, the level of risk
sharing achieved between members ￿which was already much higher than
among the other two country-pair groups in the period before 1999 ￿seems to
have increased only marginally.5 Therefore, it seems that better risk sharing
of EMU members with outsiders (the international dimension) accounts for
most of the global increase in risk sharing that we see from the results in
panel A and that others have documented before.
6 Conclusions
To our knowledge, this chapter constitutes the ￿rst systematic exploration of
the e⁄ect of EMU on the stability and volatility of key macroeconomic vari-
ables both within the euro area and internationally. We have documented
that, since the inception of the euro, industrialised economies have seen a
considerable decline in the volatility of both key nominal and ￿to a some-
5This ￿nding is compatible with Artis and Ho⁄mann (2007b) who show that EMU
is associated with better risk sharing among its members but that much of this increase
already occured before the inception of the euro.
19what smaller extent ￿also real macroeconomic indicators, including in￿ ation,
interest rates, GDP, stock markets and, most notably, consumption. While
the global decline in volatility is also likely to be due to a more stable inter-
national macreconomic environment, we condition on the impact of global
factors by focussing on the role that EMU has played in moderating idio-
syncratic volatility among its members and relative to non-members. We
￿nd that EMU has hugely increased not only the stability of EMU members
relative to each other but also relative to non-members.
While EMU seems to have particularly strongly a⁄ected the volatility of
nominal variables, such as in￿ ation or interest rates, on the real side, our
results concerning the volatility of consumption stand out as particularly im-
portant. Not only is the decline in the volatility of consumption more marked
and more clearly associated with EMU than it is for other real aggregates.
We also ￿nd evidence to suggest that this decline is clearly associated with
better risk sharing through a widening and deepening of ￿nancial markets
and that EMU has been pivotal in the recent increase of consumption risk
sharing that we and others have documented.
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23Table 1: Pre-EMU volatility and the international and internal dimensions
GDP Consumption SMI In￿ ation Long Interest Short Interest
International Dummy -0.019 0.009 -0.005 -0.01 -0.004 -0.024
(-3.3) (1.6) (-0.3) (-3.9) (-1.8) (-7.4)
EMU Dummy -0.039 0.014 -0.017 -0.022 -0.01 -0.053
(-3.8) (1.4) (-0.5) (-4.4) (-2.3) (-8.9)
Trade Concentration 0.017 0.032 -0.014 -0.026 -0.008 0.009
(0.7) (1.3) (-0.2) (-2.1) (-0.8) (0.6)
Trade Diversi￿cation -0.009 0.09 -0.055 0.017 0.019 -0.022
(-0.04) (3.9) (-0.8) (1.5) (2.0) (-1.6)
Trade Openess 0.045 0.048 -0.16 0.008 -0.032 0.002
(4.5) (4.9) (-5.2) (1.6) (-7.9) (0.3)
Financial Openess -0.007 -0.015 0.015 0 0.004 0.001
(-3.1) (-6.8) (2.3) (-0.0) (3.8) (0.6)
Capital Account Restr. 0.047 0.027 -0.078 0.027 -0.007 0.029
(4.8) (2.8) (-2.6) (5.5) (-1.9) (5.0 )
Relative Income 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.001
(2.0) (6.9) (-0.5) (-2.9) (-7.4) (-5.2)
M2/GDP 0.006 -0.008 0.037 0.003 0.009 0.006
(1.7) (-2.4) (3.8) (2.0) (6.5) (2.9)
ToT Volatility -0.56 -0.82 1 -0.23 -0.049 -0.31
(-4.2) (-6.4) (2.6) (-3.6) (-0.9) (-4.0)
Constant -0.024 -0.091 0.2 0.016 0.05 0.082
(-1.2) (-4.7) (3.3) (1.6) (6.1) (6.9)
Adj.R2 0.55 0.68 0.25 0.47 0.72 0.61
No of Obs. 91 91 91 91 91 91
Note: for each variable indicated in the column headings, country-pair standard deviations for the pre-
EMU (1990-1998) period are regressed on EMU (international/internal dimension) dummies and a set of
controls. OLS regressions. Bold coe¢ cients are signi￿cant at 5% level.
24Table 2: EMU-period volatility and the international and internal dimensions
GDP Consumption SMI In￿ ation Long Interest Short Interest
International Dummy -0.04 -0.031 0.067 0.001 -0.001 0
(-5.2) (-6.4) (4.7) (0.)7 (-0.9) (0.2)
EMU Dummy -0.077 -0.063 0.13 0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(-5.5) (-7.1) (5.2) (0.5) (-1.6) (-0.3)
Trade Concentration 0.074 0.12 -0.059 -0.004 -0.006 -0.01
(2.2) (5.6) (-1.0) (-0.9) (-2.3) (-0.9)
Trade Diversi￿cation 0.039 0.021 0.3 -0.002 0.003 0.024
(2) (1.7) (8.4) (-0.7) (1.8) (3.7)
Trade Openess 0.023 0.017 0.013 0 0 -0.001
(5.3) (6.1) (1.7) (0.6) (-0.2) (-0.5)
Financial Openess -0.003 -0.003 -0.012 0 0 -0.001
(-3.3) (-4.5) (-6.5) (1.4) (-4.8) (-4.1)
Capital Account Restr. 0.032 0.031 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.021
(2.7) (4.1) (-0.2) (-0.7) (-5.3) (-5.1)
Relative Income 0 0 0.003 0 0 0
(-1.4) (-0.71) (6.1) (-0.1) (3.9) (0.6)
M2/GDP 0.015 0.013 -0.018 0 0 0
(4.3) (6.1) (-2.8) (-0.4) (1.4) (-0.1)
ToT Volatility -0.23 -0.2 -0.43 0.03 0.018 0.008
(-3.7) (-5.1) (-3.8) (3.9) (3.8) (0.4)
Constant -0.022 -0.036 -0.15 0.007 0.002 0.012
(-1.0) (-2.5) (-3.6) (2.6) (0.9) (1.6)
Adj. R2 0.41 0.66 0.4 0.27 0.68 0.48
No of Obs. 136 136 136 136 136 136
Note: for each variable indicated in the column headings, country-pair standard deviations for the EMU
(1999-2006) period are regressed on EMU (international/internal dimension) dummies and a set of controls.
OLS regressions. Bold coe¢ cients are signi￿cant at 5% level.
25Table 3: EMU and the Decline in Volatility
GDP Consumption SMI In￿ation Long Interest Short Interest
International Dummy -0.009 -0.011 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.0006
(-2.41) (-4.55) (0.21) (-3.83) (-2.91) (-0.37)
EMU Dummy -0.022 -0.026 0.002 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005
(-3.17) (-5.71) (0.13) (-4.52) (-3.95) (-1.26)
￿pre 0.092 -0.166 -0.276 -1.038 -1.007 -0.85
(1.29) (-3.29) (-6.21) (-28.43) (-37.19) (-17.93)
Trade Concentration -0.048 -0.013 -0.028 0.002 0.013 0.044
(-2.93) (-1.18) (-0.91) (0.41) (5.23) (6.98)
Trade Diversi￿cation 0.044 0.011 0.031 -0.010 -0.009 -0.016
(2.87) (0.97) (1.06) (-2.69) (-3.69) (-2.62)
Trade Openness -0.014 -0.015 0.083 0.007 -0.002 -0.003
(-1.99) (-2.94) (5.95) (4.30) (-1.41) (-1.35)
Financial Openness -0.0007 0.002 -0.011 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001
(-0.47) (1.25) (-4.05) (-0.95) (-0.54) (0.32)
Capital Account Restr. -0.004 -0.013 0.034 0.008 -0.002 -0.004
(-0.63) (-2.80) (2.79) (4.1) (-1.65) (-1.61)
Relative Income -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0009 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0004
(-0.57) (-3.1) (2.74) (-1.16) (1.24) (0.55)
M2/GDP 0.0007 0.008 -0.019 0.001 0.0009 -0.0001
(0.33) (5.2) (-4.47) (2.37) (2.21) (-0.14)
ToT Volatility -0.338 -0.040 -0.529 0.050 0.067 0.079
(-3.61) (-0.57) (-3.19) (2.19) (5.06) (2.19)
Constant 0.020 0.023 -0.038 0.005 0.005 0.008
(1.57) (2.33) (-1.47) (1.57) (2.01) (1.31)
Adj.R2 0.51 0.61 0.66 0.94 0.99 0.91
No of Obs. 91 91 91 91 91 91
Note: For each variable given in the column heading, we regress the di⁄erences in the country-pair
speci￿c standard deviations between the pre-EMU and EMU-periods. on the EMU (international/internal
dimension) dummies. In addition, the regressions also include our set of controls, including the lagged
(i.e. pre-EMU period) volatility ￿pre of the respective variable. OLS regressions. Bold coe¢ cients are
signi￿cant at 5% level.
26Table 4: EMU and International Consumption Risk Sharing
Panel A













No of Obs. 2277 1518
Panel C: Risk sharing by country pair group
EMU Outsiders 0.67 0.79
EMU & Non EMU 0.63 0.53*
IntraEMU 0.45￿ 0.44*
Notes: For both the pre-EMU and the EMU periods, the table reports panel regressions of the form
e c
ij
t = ￿ + ￿0g gdp
ij
t + ￿ij + ￿t + const + "
ij
t
in panel A and
e c
ij














+ ￿ij + ￿t + const + "
ij
t





t and x stands for the logarithms of consumption (c) and GDP in turn.
t-statistics in parentheses, coe¢ cients signi￿cant at the 5% level are in bold. Panel C reports the fraction
of unshared risk among the respective country pair groups, i.e. ￿0 for outsiders, ￿0 + ￿1 for risk sharing
between EMU and non-EMU and ￿0 + ￿2 for risk sharing among EMU countries. An asterisk in panel C
signals if risk sharing in the respective country-pair group is signi￿cantly di⁄erent (at the 5% level) from
the risk sharing achieved among non-EMU members.
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p
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p
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p
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p
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b
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